Tomáš Hoch

De facto states constitute an interesting anomaly in the international system of sovereign states. No matter how long their control of claimed territory has lasted or how effective their capacities to provide governmental services to its population are, they fail to achieve international recognition. In the post-Soviet space, this is the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. Popescu (2007) defines the EU’s interests in relation to these de facto states in three ways: reducing (financial) dependence on Russia by diversifying development opportunities, strengthening the EU’s reputation and spreading of European values, creating links between conflicting parties and promoting their mutual reconciliation. Current EU strategy toward unrecognized states is based on strict emphasis on the territorial integrity of Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. This is expressed not only in public statements by leaders of the EU member states, but also in the absence of European Neighbourhood Policy Action plans for de facto states. Based on secondary literature and field research I claim, this policy leads to a low level of development
opportunities for the de facto states through foreign direct investments, international trade, development aid or remittances. These external factors of development should play an important role in fulfilling the EU’s desired goals. It is worth considering whether the current EU strategy towards de facto states in post-Soviet space is appropriate and if it would not be better to replace it with another one, which would more likely support the diversification of development opportunities of de facto states, would contribute to peace negotiations of protracted conflicts and which would be more suitable for promoting EU values and interests in this part of the world.

The aim of the present study is to map out an important part of the post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus as Georgia and its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia sought to find  a peaceful solution to their conflicts. The study attempts to analyze the often crucial role of Russia in the evolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts both in their military and post-war phases in the period of 1991-2008. The study illustrates that among a range of factors that have shapen Moscow's increasingly assertive attitude toward Georgia and its breakdown regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia affecting the transformation of the official peace processes have belonged Russia's internal centralization, coupled with continuous economic growth, the increasing role of the South Caucasus in Moscow's geostrategic thinking, as well Georgia's pro-Western stance and Moscow's fear of a regional spill-over effect following the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus.

De facto státy představují zajímavou anomálii v mezinárodním systému svrchovaných států. Bez ohledu na to, jak dlouhou dobu mají vlády de facto států kontrolu nad nárokovaným územím, či jak efektivně jsou schopny zajišťovat veřejné služby vlastnímu obyvatelstvu, nedaří se jim dosáhnout mezinárodního uznání. Toto je případ Abcházie, jejíž vnější suverenita byla dosud uznána pouze šesti členskými zeměmi OSN (Ruskem, Venezuelou, Nikaraguou, Nauru, Tuvalu a Vanuatu). Diplomatické neuznání má celou řadů důsledků pro hospodářský a sociální rozvoj. Oproti jiným regionům s válečnou zkušeností, jež byly mezinárodně uznány většinou zemí zastoupených v OSN, jsou současné možnosti rozvoje v Abcházii mnohem složitější. Gruzínská snaha izolovat tento problematický region vyústila v nemožnost rozvoje prostřednictvím vnějších faktorů rozvoje, jako jsou přímé zahraniční investice, mezinárodní obchod nebo příjmy z remitencí. Na základě terénního výzkumu jsem došel k závěru, že ačkoliv je EU největším donorem v Abcházii, při současném důrazu na teritoriální integritu Gruzie a neexistenci vlastního Akčního plánu pro Abcházii v rámci ENP, mají aktivity EU pouze malý dopad na rozvoj tohoto de facto státu. Rozvojová spolupráce je silně politizovaná a politické imperativy jsou nadřazeny otázkám rozvoje. Humanitární pomoc je sice velmi potřebná, ale vzhledem k legislativním a institucionálním překážkám na ni v Abcházii špatně navazují programy obnovy a rozvojové spolupráce. Abcházská občanská společnost je sice velmi aktivní v domácích tématech, ale má pouze minimální přesahy přes linii příměří. Tím nenaplňují organizace občanské společnosti horizontální potřebu budování míru a takřka nepřispívají k transformaci konfliktu. K tomu, aby v tomto regionu přispívala EU k rozvoji více, je zapotřebí změnit její strategii k de facto státům. Pokud se tak nestane, bude abcházský rozvoj závislý pouze na vnitřních faktorech a pomoci z Ruska.

The goal of our text is to analyze Russia's role during the transformation of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict during the years 1992-2008. Major milestones of the official peace process are set in the context of Russian-Georgian relations. We then proceed to the analysis of the internal changes within the Russian Federation at the turn of the millennium and try to find a connection between this internal transformation of Russia and the transformation of the conflict in Abkhazia.

The aim of our study is to map an important part of the history of the Caucasus, when the conflicts in the breakaway regions escalated, and when the government de facto States and their mother countries were trying to find a peaceful resolution of the post-war situation. For the purpose of this study, we chose a historical and analytical-descriptive approach. From a methodological point of view it is an area study. The aim is not primarily a comparison of the studied cases, but the understanding of certain processes that occurred in the South Caucasus region. The text is structured as follows, first we deal with linguistic, ethnic and religious background of the conflict in Abkhazia, then we move to the escalation of the conflict, and consequently the course of the peace process in this de facto state. The same structure is then applied to South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although conflicts in post-Soviet regions have been the subject of much attention, some aspects of these conflicts still remain somewhat neglected by academics. One such aspect is the role played by Church organizations in conflict transformation. The concept of conflict transformation places considerable emphasis on civil society, which – in its broader sense – includes church organizations. Representatives of churches have direct access to persons who are involved in conflicts, and thus they have the potential to influence public opinion and the ability to bring hostile parties together to engage in dialogue. The aim of this study is to identify the factors underlying the low level of engagement in the peacebuilding process by Orthodox religious institutions in Georgia and Abkhazia and which prevent these organizations from exercising a positive influence over conflict transformation. The field research for the article was conducted via interviews with representatives of Abkhazian and Georgian civil society, and this data is supplemented by the public declarations of church representatives with relevance to conflict transformation. The incompatibility of the views held by the two church communities (those of Georgia and Abkhazia) regarding the cause of the escalation of the conflict and the highly politicized nature of the respective church organizations, both of which overtly support and contribute to domestic nationalist discourses in their respective societies, have been identified as the main factors limiting the peacebuilding potential of the churches in the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process.

Dichotomy between endo-ethnonyms (the way certain people call themselves) and exo-ethnonyms (what the nation is called by the neighbours) is well known from Europe. Also the etymology of both the types of ethnonyms (and also toponyms) in Europe is usually widely known. However, it is not only Europe the phenomenon of endo- and exo-ethnonyms (and toponyms) is obviously typical of. In our paper we deal with the region of the South Caucasus and the endo- and exo-ethnonyms and toponyms of the three most numerous South Caucasian nations – Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians.

Throughout the Cold War, the international donor community had confined their effort in conflict situations primarily to humanitarian aid and ideologically motivated development cooperation. Donors were not prepared to deal with the multiple and complex challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, which came with the end of the cold war and were connected with the processes of globalisation. After a period of violent conflict, war-torn societies face many challenges. In many cases they lack the financial, institutional and human resources to solve the problems bounded with post-conflict reconstruction. External actors are asked to play a more active role in assisting countries emerging from conflicts, but there are legal, budgetary and ethical limits of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate on the case study of Abkhazia, that the classical paradigm of
linear cycle of post-conflict reconstruction via the fluent transformation from a short term humanitarian aid to a longer term development cooperation, can not function in
separatist regions.

In many respects, de facto states play a highly specific role as actors within the international system of sovereign states. The lack of international recognition has tangible political and economic impacts on the functioning of de facto states, and so the attempt to persuade domestic actors and the international community of the legitimacy of their claims to independence ranks among the most important components of these states' policy-not only in foreign policy, but also in domestic policy. The aim of this text is to contribute to our understanding of how internal legitimization strategies for Abkhazian statehood are constructed and how they impact upon the foreign policy of this de facto state. Field research was carried out via interviews with important official state representatives of Abkhazia and important non-state actors-including journalists and representatives of non-profit organizations, universities, the Church and other key institutions which influence public opinion within and beyond this de facto state.